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NOTRE DAME LAWYER
tary83 The courts closely examine the'facts to see that there has been
a divestiture of control from the grantor during his lifetime. If the
instrument remains within his control, courts declare his intention
testamentary; that is, from his acts it is apparent that he intended to
keep the property until his death.3 4 Delivery of the instrument may be
also validly made to a third party for the actual grantee to be delivered
at the death of the grantor, and this will not make the conveyance
35
testamentary.
Recapitulation of salient facts and principles will bring within view
the answer sought here. We have seen that a conveyance made within
one day of death was upheld as an inter vivos disposition. So long as
the grantor clearly intends to make an inter vivos disposition and validly delivers the instrument, his motives seem of little consequence, providing they are legitimate. Even when the grantor makes a will and a
deed on the same day this does not destroy the inter vivos nature of the
absolute conveyance. Presence of valuable consideration given in exchange for the property is a helpful test in support of an inter vivos
disposition, although it is not an essential element thereto. Consequently so long as the grantor executes an absolute deed and shows by his
acts and words unequivocally that it is his intention to pass the title
presently and immediately however near to death he is, seems of little
consequence. Nor does it matter who the grantee is. In more graphic
terms, in the last few minutes of life a grantor may execute an absolute
deed and deliver it, so long as he is mentally competent, and it will be
given effect as an inter vivos disposition.
Warren A. Deahl.

MILITARY ACTION IN LABOR DisPuTEs.-IHistorians of labor in the
United States place the beginning of American labor movements in the
year 1827 when at Philadelphia American wage earners for the first
time joined together as a class, regardless of class lines, 'in a contest
with employers. As early as 1786 the printers "turned out" demanding
a minimum wage of six dollars a week; still, it was not until the Philadelphia meeting that the first union of trade associations organized. A
swift century of machine development and mass production has knit
these original strands of organized effort into a vast pattern of labor
federations and unions. Notions of collective bargaining, employer obligations and strikes quickly followed the wake of progressive organization. Where meditation failed strikes were employed.
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Rypka v. Field, ...... Cal. App....,

115 Pac. (2) 521 (1941).

Oswald v. Caldwell, 225 Ill. 224, 80 N. E. 131 (1906) ; but see: Szymczak v.
Szymczak, 306 Ill. 54f, 138 N. E. 218 (1923).
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Southern v. Southern, ...... Mo..._, 52 S. W. (2) 868 (1932).

NOTES
The great railway strike of 1877 paralyzed almost all the lines between the Atlantic and the Mississippi. Pitched battles took place between strikers and scabs. So great was the danger to the disinterested
citizenry that the five governors of Maryland, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Illinois and New York called out their respective militias and ordered
martial law. In Pittsburgh alone scores of lives were lost and $2,000,000
worth of property burned to the ground. Finally, the strike was broken
with the aid of Federal troops.
Interference by state authority in this violence warned labor that
strike violence would not be tolerated. Then, as now, almost complete
uniformity existed in the constitutional and statutory provisions of the
various states on the relationship of the executive and the militia. In
every state constitution except New York it is provided that the militia
shall be subordinate to the civil authority. Provisions prohibiting the
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus are found in all of the states.
Likewise, forty-seven of the states provide in their constitutions that
the governor be commander-in-chief of the military forces while Maryland designates it by statute. When the several governors declared a
state of martial law to exist at the time of the great railway strike, they
relied upon the words of Chief Justice Taney in Luther v. Borden.1 He
upheld the right of the Rhode Island legislature to declare a state of
martial law because of Dorrs rebellion. He stated: "If the government
of Rhode Island deemed the armed opposition so formidable, and so
ramified throughout the state, as to require the use of military force and
the declaration of martial law, we see no ground on which -this court
can question its authority." This decision, however, dealt more with
the power of the legislature than that of the governor. It was not until
1909 that the question of the governor's power to call out the militia
as a protection against strike violence came squarely before the high
tribunal.
In September, 1903, the Western Federation of Mines struck for an
eight-hour day. Violence predominated until troops arrived in November. When a purported peace agreement was arranged in the following
March, the militia withdrew. A few days later a mob of "Citizen Alliance Members" (vigilantes of the time) searched the towns in San
Miguel county, broke into residences and collected about sixty miners
who were too friendly with the strikers. The group was escorted from
the county with orders never to return. When they attempted to come
back in mass, the civil authorities requested the governor to proclaim
martial law. The governor complied. On the same day one Moyer, President of the Federation, was arrested and imprisoned by the militia.
When the governor concluded his term of office, Moyer sued on grounds
that he had been denied due process of law by the imprisonment. The
1 Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1 (U. S.) (1848).
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case 2 came before the Supreme Court. A unanimous decision supported
the action of the governor and Mr. Justice Holmes stated the principle: "So long as such arrests are made in good faith and in the honest belief that they are needed to head the insurrection off, the governor
is the final judge ....

When it comes to a decision by the head of the

state on a matter involving its life, the ordinary rights of the individual
must yield to what he deems the necessities of the moment. Public danger warrants the substitution of the executive process for judicial
process." The last sentence of this extract from the opinion neatly summarizes one of the greatest points in favor of executive interference in
labor disputes - expediency. By granting the governor power to enforce his own proclamations, he is capable of subduing mob violence
and widespread damage. The principle is not undisputed, however. Professor Charles Fariman labels this emergency, delegation of judicial
process: 3 "A defective method likely to degenerate into a grim class
struggle. One cannot deny that the state militia has on some occasions
served as the champion of employers against striking workmen." This
view has been strengthened by the findings of the Colorado Strike Investigation 4 where state militiamen seemed to be on the side of the
mine operators. Despite the minority view as expressed by Professor
Fariman, both reason and authority dictate that when in pursuance of
law, an executive proclaims a condition of insurrection or of martial
law, that decision is final. 5
From the case rulings we have seen that the executive power of the
state, the governor, may at his discretion call out the militia and proclaim a state of martial law. This conclusion, however, develops another
problem. In time of a violent strike what are the limits upon the governor's delegated power of judicial interpretation? -Admittedly there is
discord between the Federal District Courts in defining the governor's
scope of constitutional power. As in similar problems the courts express
negative limits rather than positive powers. While it is impossible to
draw definite axioms, we may at least examine the limitations. The early
and much quoted, Ex Parte Mulligan,6 stated: "Martial law can never
exist where the courts are open and in proper and unobstructed exercise
of their jurisdiction." Yet, the states have not followed this pattern of
procedure. Often the state -executive proclaims martial law but neither
closes the courts nor supplants them with military court martials governing with the Articles of War. In Re Boyle,1 In Re Moyer,8 and Ex
2

3
4

Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U. S. 78, 29 Sup. Ct. 235 (1909).
See 19 Cornell L. Q. 20.

House Docket, No. 1630, 63rd Congress, 3rd Sess. at p. 16.
5 Vanderheyden v. Young, 11 Johns (N. Y.) 150 (1814);'Martin v. Mott,
12 (Wheat.) U. S. 19 (1827); Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1 (U. S.) (1848); Ex

Parte Moore, 64 N. C. 802 (1870); In Re Boyle, 6 Idaho 609 (1899); Frank v.
Smith, 142 Ky. 232, 134 S. W. 484 (1911).

6
7

Ex Parte Milligan, 4 Wall 2 (U. S.) (1866).
In Re Boyle, 6 Idaho 609, 57 Pac. 706 (1899).

NOTES
ParteMcDonald 9 applications for writs of habeas corpus were brought
and denied on grounds that the governor's declaration was conclusive
of insurrection and that preventive detention during the emergency was
a lawful means of accomplishing his duty to suppress the insurrection.
A problem of serious nature arose in West Virginia when an acute
labor dispute broke out in the coal fields. The governor proclaimed that
"a state of war" existed. The Court of Appeals held this declaration to
be conclusive and thereupon conceded to the governor powers appropriate to a commander on the field of battle. The Court refused to interene when a military commission sentenced civilians to the penitentiary for terms of years. This exercise of punitive martial law in West
Virginia gave rise to the setting up of military tribunals for the trial of
civilians during the longshoremans strike at Galveston in 1920 and
again in the packers strike at Nebraska City in 1922. In each case the
military custody was challenged in a Federal District court and in each
case habeas corpus was denied while the exercise of the "war-power"
was expressly upheld. 10 Smith v. Whitney 1 ruled that the acts of a
court martial within the scope of its jurisdiction could not be controlled
or reviewed in the civil courts by writ of prohibition or otherwise. This
would lead us to reason that an aroused striker causing a physical injury or death to his fellow might enj6y his privileges under the
fourteenth amendment before a military court if the governor had proclaimed martial law in the strict sense. Military tribunals have a reputation for their expeditious process, a reputation which might be well
impressed upon the perpetrators of mob violence.
It is vital to note that in all the cases where the executive proclamation of martial law is questioned on constitutional grounds, the courts
are careful to investigate the grounds on which the state executive made
his declaration. The circumstances of the insurrection, the good-faith
of the governor and the suppression of any right in its relation to restoring law and order are all considered. For example: In Stirling v.
Constantin 12 the Governor of Texas desirous of limiting the production of oil declared a state of martial law to exist, fixed by proclamation
the amount of oil to be shipped and claimed that since martial law existed he and his adjutant-general were not amendable to court action.
The Supreme court took jurisdiction in this case to prevent the denial
of due process of law and condemned the governor for calling out the
troops to act as civil officers. Although this decision did not involve a
state of martial law proclaimed in time of labor violence, it shows that
8 In Re Moyer, 35 Col. 154, 85 Pac. 190 (1905).
9 Ex Parte McDonald, 49 Mont. 454, 143 Pac. 947, 952 (1914).
10 U. S. ex rel. Seymour v. Fischer, 280 Fed. 208 (1922); U. S. ex rel. McMasters v. Walters, 268 Fed. 69 (1920).
11 Smith v. Whitney, 116 U. S. 167, 29 Law ed. 601, 6 Sup. Ct. (1886).
12 Stirling v. Constantin, 287 U. S. 378, 53 Sup. Ct. 190 (1932).
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the governors discretion is subject and amendable to review. There
seems to be no valid reason why this doctrine of judicial review would
be inapplicable where the governor acted in bad faith.
This problem of military action in labor disputes has been widely
heralded throughout the last decade. In the year ending June 30, 1934,
7000 guardsmen were called out in 28 states to restore law and order to
districts overcome by strike and riot. In the next year the national
guard was called 84 times in 31 states. Each subsequent year shows
increasing number of calls until 1940.1 Of these, two cases are especially worth noting. On July 26, 1934 Governor Olson of Minnesota
declared martial law for the city of Minneapolis. The Adjutant-General of the state militia conducted troops to the city where he promulgated certain rules and regulations in order to prevent injury and quell
strike violence. Only certain trucks were permitted to use the highways
under the restrictions. One Powers Mercantile Company refused to obey
on grounds that the regulation was discriminatory and that the power
of the governor was unconstitutional. The court ruled: 14 "The means
and methods he has adopted for restoring law and order are not subject
to review by the courts, since such matters must necessarily rest entirely in his discretion as chief executive of the state of Minnesota."
. . . Despite that decision, the same Federal District Court ruled two
years afterwards that: 15 "A rule (as expounded in the Powers case)
which would permit an official, whose duty it was to enforce the law,
to disregard the very law which it was his duty to enforce, in order to
pacify a mob or suppress an insurrection, would deprive all citizens of
any security in the enjoyment of their lives, libirty or property. The
churches, the stores, the newspapers, the channels of communication
and the homes of the people could be closed under such a rule. Carried
to its logical conclusion, under such a rule the banks could be closed
and emptied of their cash to prevent bank robberies; the post-offices
locked to prevent mail being robbed and the citizens kept off the street
to prevent hold-ups. A state government should not suppress rights
which it is the duty of the state to defend ...in order to suppress disorder." These two Minnesota cases represent diametrically opposed
judicial opinions as to the executive power. When we consider that the
court here changed its opinion from one extreme to the opposite in a
period less than two years, we better realize the discord, although the
greater weight of authority supports a broad scope of executive power
when an emergency arises from labor violence.
When Governor McNutt declared martial law to protect private
property from damage in 1935, Otis Cox brought an action for an injunction against McNutt and by bill of complaint alleged the declaraSee 13 Wisconsin L. R. 314.
Powers Mercantile Co. v. Olson, 7 F. Supp. 865 (1934).
15 Strutwear Knitting Co. v. Olson, 13 F. Supp. 384 (1936).
13
14

NOTES
tion null and void. The court held: 16 "The power of the governor and
his subsequent acts are justified in that they are to be exercised upon
certain emergencies, upon great occasions of state and under circumstances which may be vital to the existence of the union. The nature of
the power necessarily implies a great range of honest judgment falling
within the executive exercise to maintain peace. Constitutional rights
must give way in time of insurrection. The Governor may order arrests
to prevent hostility."
These incidents of past, experience point the way for definite conclusions. First, the executive proclamation that insurrection exists is
decisive. This power is expressly granted in either the state constitution or in the statutes. Second, the executive authority may institute a
qualified degree of martial .rule and the court will uphold all measures
which are shown to have seemed necessary and proper at the moment
of actual or threatened strike violence. Generally, we may say that the
executive power to initiate military action is comensurate with the
emergency. If the situation is grave, the civil courts may be closed and
a military commission appointed by the governor to substitute for the
judiciary. In all events the power is potentially a vast one. Discriminate,
ly applied it bargains a temporary suspension of rights for a restoration
of law and order. We realize the conflict between the decision of the
state and the personal liberty of the individual but justify such military
action on the maxim: "Salus populi est suprema lex."
William B. Lawless, Jr.

PRESUMPTION OF SURvIvoRsHIP WHERE Two PERSONS DIE IN CoMMON DISASTER -

GENERALLY -

AND IN PENNA. IN PARTICULAR-

This is a problem which deserves a great amount of consideration. It
has been heatedly discussed from its inception and is even yet undetermined in some jurisdictions in the absence of statute. In spite of the
disagreement among legal minds over a period of years, we can safely
say that now a general rule has been formulated on the proposition.
The common law rule is commonly stated to be that where two or
more persons perish in the same disaster and there is no fact or circumstance to prove which survived, the law will no more presume that
all died at the same instant than it will presume that one survived the
other.' In the absence of evidence from which the contrary may be inferred, all may be considered to have perished at the same moment, not
because that fact is presumed, but because, since those asserting the
contrary have failed to prove it, property rights must necessarily be
10 Cox v. MeNutt, 13 F. Supp. 355 (1935).
1 Carpenter v. Severin, 201 Iowa 969, 204 N. W. 448 (1925).

